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I. INTRODUCTION
{1} "The creation and rapid growth of the Internet have been 'hailed' [as] one of the greatest technological
advances in recent history,"[1] remarked one scholar of Internet law and jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals characterizes the Internet as "a global network of interconnected computers allow[ing] individuals
and organizations around the world to communicate with one another."[2] It is, therefore, not surprising that
the Internet impacts every aspect of our daily lives. The Web is the fastest growing part of the Internet, and
thus, an important mechanism for commerce. [3] Authors Joseph Zammit and Lynette Herscha explain, "[t]he
rapid growth in technology, and the advent of the World Wide Web allows both individuals and corporations
to conduct business and interact in a much broader geographic arena than historically possible."[4] With
Internet users estimated at 200 million users in 1999,[5]it is expected that one billion computers will be
networked worldwide in less than ten years.[6] Accordingly, religious organizations and churches are
increasing their use of the Web. This means consequently that more religious organizations and congregations
will soon become intellectual property clients and litigants.
{2} A recent survey of Internet use conducted by Lynne DeMichele indicates that the "explosion of Internet
use has brought variety to new forms of religion."[7] People search the Web looking for a church's social
activism and relief efforts, but are less concerned with church-related services and programs.[8] While the
Internet is blamed for the devaluation of our society,[9] there is no denying that spiritual opportunities exist
on the Web for churches.
{3} The Web allows religious organizations more versatility than does paper media. For example, as a special
interest group, churches are targeted for special Internet products and rates.[10] National and international
newsletters can be published online with ease and convenience.[11] Some websites even contain elaborate
search engines that survey information about a particular faith.[12] Postings from evangelical leaders can be
found [13] with merely the wiggle of a mouse. Congregations can reach other church members [14] or buy
sacred documents over the Web.[15] In fact, it should come as no surprise that "[e]ven the Vatican has a
website."[16] Internet simulcasts of the Holy Land Sights, such as the Golden Gate and Western Wall, can be
found on the Web; likewise, plans for "Messiahcam" tours of the Mount of Olives are soon to come.[17]
Muslims, Jews, and Christians alike use the Internet for newsletters, bulletin boards, and more complex
communications.[18] One can fine disclaimers on the Web granting permission to reproduce copyrightable
material,[19] as well as options, sponsored by churches, for finding less costly advertising banners.[20] As
could have been expected, the first "cyberchurch" already exists - the Harvest Christian Fellowship - formed
in Southern California, and it claims that around one thousand people visit the site each week for music,
prayer, and sermons.[21]
{4} While there are many positive opportunities for churches on the Web, some negative aspects cannot be
overlooked. Although we live "[i]n a world divided by barriers of language and culture, the Internet is the
nexus that connects the most rural outposts of technology to the global business centers."[22] Therefore, the
Internet has quickly become a hotbed for claims of Lanham Act violations.[23]
II. CYBERLAW AND THE CHURCH
{5} The Church of Scientology [24] is not a Web litigation neophyte,[25] and it became a plaintiff in one of
the most-cited and best-known Internet cases, Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line
Communication Services[26] ("RTC"). In RTC, the Church of Scientology filed for injunctive relief against a
former minister, Dennis Erlich, alleging direct copyright infringement and trade secret violations.[27]
{6} Netcom and Tom Klemesrud were both enjoined as defendants for indirect infringement,[28] but the
majority of the court's opinion focused on Erlich's misappropriation of secret church documents, and
subsequent posting of the documentation on the Web.[29] The standard for a fair use defense was negated by
Erlich's unauthorized posting of the church documents. Further, Erlich's First Amendment free speech claim
was defeated because he copied large portions of the original text in the church documentation.[30]
{7} RTC and its sister cases[31] are generally cited for the proposition that an Internet access provider is not
a common carrier with absolute immunity from liability under 17 U.S.C. Section 111(a)(3).[32] However,
these cases demonstrate the standard for a fair use defense on the Internet.[33]
{8} The Internet is no longer the domain of "Netizens" and academics alone; now, it has become a truly
public domain. While RTC was the only church case which dealt with copyright and trade secrets, a new
wave of church cases centers on trademark infringement and cybersquatting.
III. NEW CASE LAW
A. Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Entertainment Group ("IEG"), Inc.[34]
[9] In anticipation of Pope John Paul II's scheduled visit to the United States in 1999, the Archdiocese of St.
Louis registered various tradenames and marks, making the Archdiocese owners of the trademarks in July
1998.[35] The common law trademarks and names were created and maintained by the Archdiocese as part
of publicizing and promoting the visit of the Pope.
[10] Sometime after the Archdiocese registered these marks, IEG registered two domain names,
"papalvisit.com" and "papalvisit1999.com."[36] IEG's websites included limited information about the
upcoming papal visit,[37] as well as postings of sexually-explicit Internet sites.[38] In addition, the IEG sites
contained hyperlinks to sites which held an assortment of off-color stories and jokes regarding the Pope and
the Roman Catholic Church.[39]
{11} In late 1998, the Archdiocese became aware of two domain names operated by IEG and the information
provided by the sites.[40] Subsequently, the Archdiocese filed suit alleging trademark infringement,
trademark dilution, false designation of origin, and unfair competition. The Archdiocese asked the Missouri
court for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a preliminary injunction.[41] The Archdiocese sought to
enjoin IEG from using the domain names "papalvisit1999.com" and "papalvisit.com," or any other variations
on the Papal Visit 1999 trademark and tradenames, which the Archdiocese registered.[42] Applying the
Missouri Long-Arm Statute Section 056.500.1(3)[43] and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA")
which amended Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act), along with the Lanham Act,[44] the court allowed the
injunctive relief.[45]
{12} The court found an adequate basis for jurisdiction, claiming that hyperlinks within a website give a
website active character and aggressively encourage Web users to explore other links.[46] With jurisdiction
established, the court dealt with the defendant's First Amendment argument.[47] Defendant IEG claimed that
its websites were protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment; however, the court said that
free speech and website content were not at issue.[48]
{13} The central issue of the case was the use of the marks by IEG on websites. The court found that the use
of pornographic material by IEG under these domain names was not only infringement on the Archdiocese
trademark rights, but also further diluted and tarnished the family of marks registered.[49] The activities of
IEG were obviously contrary to the spiritual and positive images the Archdiocese strove to achieve in
association with the Pope's visit.[50] The court went further and applied one of the rules first espoused in
Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky,[51] holding that proof of economic harm is not required to show irreparable
injury due to dilution of a mark.[52] The court ordered IEG to cease use of the "papalvisit" family of domain
names.[53]
B. Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky
{14} Jews For Jesus ("J4J"), an international nonprofit organization, founded in 1973,[54] promotes a
ministry teaching that "Jesus is the Messiah of Israel and Savior of the World."[55] The organization claimed
a common law service mark for the phrase "Jews For Jesus," as well as a trademark right for the phrase,
stylized by substituting "the Star of David" for the "o" in their name.[56] The mark's history included prior
ownership by Hineni Ministries, but the mark was subsequently assigned to J4J.[57] This particular mark is
in use by the plaintiff all over the world on brochures, pamphlets, radio, national newspapers, and the
Internet.[58] In fact, the name and mark proved to be in use by the plaintiff for more than twenty-five years.
[59] Upon creating an Internet site, the plaintiff's domain name did not contain the characteristic "Star of
David," but instead was listed as "jews-for-jesus.org."[60]
{15} Brodsky, a professional Internet site developer and attorney, established a website referring to "J4J," on
which he openly criticized the organization.[61] Apparently aware of both, the federally-registered marks and
the common law mark,[62] Brodsky first sought the mark Jews for Jesus for Judaism;[63] however, this
particular domain name was already registered.[64] Instead, Brodsky registered the name "jewsforjesus.org"
as his domain name.[65]
{16} By December 1997, J4J discovered Brodsky's website and notified him that they possessed the rights to
the "mark."[66] The defendant's reply was that he did not see any infringement between the alleged
trademark and the domain name.[67] Brodsky then registered a second domain name, "jews-for-jesus.com."
[68] Under the second domain name, Brodsky added a disclaimer, but failed to update the disclaimer for the
first domain name.[69] J4J then sent Brodsky another letter asking that his use of both domain names be
ceased.[70] When Brodsky denied any wrongdoing, J4J filed for injunctive relief against him.
{17} The J4J court supported the religious organization's claim and denied Brodsky any defense under the
concepts of free speech, fair use,[71] descriptive mark,[72] and genericness.[73] In its detailed opinion, the
court outlined the standard for injunctive relief, and distinguished J4J from other Internet trademark cases.
The court allowed the application of 15 U.S.C. Section 1125, the Trademark Dilution Act, in spite of the fact
that the statutory requirement that activities of the infringer and plaintiff must be done "in connection with
goods or services,"[74] was not met. The court deemed Brodsky's criticisms to be commercial speech, in so
far as the criticism harmed J4J commercially and inhibited Internet users efforts to locate the plaintiff.[75] In
essence, the court ruled that trademark violations must be "in connection" with goods or services.[76]
IV. LESSONS FROM ARCHDIOCESE AND J4J
A. Jurisdiction
{18} One Internet scholar as identified that, "[t]he recurring problem with the current crop of Internet
jurisdictional issues is not that lawyers and judges do not understand the nature of the technology, but that
computer communication and the Internet are anything but 'traditional.'"[77] Law student author, Cheryl
Conner, similarly reported that, "an enormous amount of attention has been paid recently to jurisdictional
issues, arising from the maintenance of [w]ebsites."[78] Courts are under almost assiduous pressure to
develop new jurisdictional rules to deal with legal conflicts that occur using this new technology as a result of
this increased media and academic attention.[79] The fact that Internet business transactions are much easier
to adjudicate functions as a key issue in most Internet personal jurisdiction cases.[80]
{19} In order for a court to have judicial authority over an action, it must have personal jurisdiction over the
parties, in addition to subject matter jurisdiction.[81] The major goal of pleading the issue of jurisdiction is to
ensure that defendants are not brought before an inconvenient forum.[82] Real-world principles of
jurisdiction have evolved over the past one-hundred years, and they have simplified jurisdiction to a test of
action versus location.[83] Thus, the intangible nature of the Internet makes jurisdiction difficult to apply.
Whereas the court's power over a person, known as personal jurisdiction, has often governed the jurisdiction
of a court, the power over the class of claims, or subject-matter jurisdiction, has been applied more
frequently. Where nonresident defendants are concerned, evidence of minimum contacts with the forum state
is crucial in determining if the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant is proper.[84] Absence these
contacts, the forum is classed as non conveniens, since the defendant would not reasonably be bound to
defend a suit in the forum state.[85]
{20} For the Internet, several principal cases serve as benchmarks for determining jurisdiction. In
CompuServe v. Patterson,[86] the Sixth Circuit ruled that the defendant's posting material on its site, which
could be downloaded and purchased, was sufficient contact to allow an Ohio court to have jurisdiction over
Patterson, although he resided in Houston, Texas.[87] In the famous "Blue Note" case, Bensusan Restaurant
Corporation v. King,[88] the Second Circuit dismissed the claims of Bensusan on the basis of lack of
jurisdiction. The court distinguished Bensusan from the Patterson case on the grounds that the website was
an advertisement, and that it did not involve King deriving income from any interstate transactions. With
Bensusan and Patterson as the ends of the spectrum, cases, such as Inset Systems v. Instruction Set[89] and
Heroes Inc. v. Heroes Foundation,[90] fill in the remaining gray areas in the middle of the continuum. In
each of these cases, the courts determined that sites, which solicit funds, contribution, or sales and provide
toll-free numbers, are actively availing themselves of the benefits of the forum state, and thus, invite courts of
the forum state to have personal jurisdiction over them. More recently, in Cybersell v. Cybersell,[91] the
Ninth Circuit confirmed the trial court's rationale that sites with local numbers and no exchange of
information from the host computer do not allow a court to exercise jurisdiction over a Netizen.[92]
{21} However, the "purposeful availment" aspects of these prior cases are not the only means of arguing
jurisdiction over a nonresident Netizen. Although IEG proffered a claim that the Second Circuit lacked
personal jurisdiction, the court rationalized jurisdiction over IEG on the basis of the Missouri Court's findings
in Maritz v. Cybergold.[93]
{22} In Cybergold, the defendant offered a mailing list, which would eventually transmit information to its
registered users.[94] The Cybergold court ruled that jurisdiction had been established, based on the
"conscious transmission" to Missouri Internet users.[95] The court failed to accept the argument that the site
was merely a passive one.[96]
{23} Additionally, the court added that committing a tortious act in Missouri triggered its long-arm statute
and that the nature of a trademark infringement claim is a tortious act.[97] Given that Maritz was decided by
this same circuit, it is not surprising that the court applied the same standard to the Archdiocese case. The
Maritz personal jurisdiction standard, which is not universally applied in the nation's courts today,[98]
indicates that long-arm statutes and a site which promotes business, when coupled with trademark use, are
enough to satisfy the requirements for personal jurisdiction. The Maritz court applied a five-part standard for
determining personal jurisdiction.[99] These five factors include: "(1) the nature and quality of the contacts
with the forum state; (2) the quantity of [those] ... contacts; (3) the relation to the cause of action to the
contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; [and] (5) the convenience of
the parties."[100]
{24} Application of these five factors emphasizes the nature of the contact and any public policy within the
forum state. Where a tort is involved, there may not be multiple contacts in the real-world sense. Thus, one
generic contact may give rise to a forum having personal jurisdiction over a Netizen.
{25} In Archdiocese and J4J, jurisdiction was based on the tortious conduct, coupled with the forum state's
policies designed to prevent such acts.[101] Although Bensusan is contrary to these two cases, any
precedential value Bensusan had previously enjoyed was abrogated by proving an element of purposeful
availment based on the exchange of revenue.[102] Archdiocese and J4J indicate a compatible basis for
jurisdiction not based on business transactions, but instead linked to nothing more than intent to do business.
[103] Put more simply, the act of setting up a webpage for access by others satisfies the "in commerce"
requirement of the Lanham Act.[104]
B. Trademark Infringement and Cyber Piracy
{26} Another aspect of personal jurisdiction relates specifically to domain names and the likelihood of
confusion. In both, Archdiocese and J4J, jurisdiction was extended over the various defendants because the
defendants were guilty of cybersquatting, which is also known as cyber-piracy.[105]
{27} Cybersquatting occurs when a party purchases a domain name using a known trademark. Once
purchased, the party generally intends to influence the trademark owner by selling the domain name.[106]
Similar domain name hijacking cases occur when parties register a competitor's domain name with the
specific intention of injuring or taking advantage of the mistyped domain name of a trade or service mark
owner,[107] preventing the owner from using its own name on the Internet.[108]
{28} Cybersquatting is a uniquely Internet-limited, per se cause of action. First, the plaintiff proves
ownership of a trademark. Then, the plaintiff must prove that the "cyber pirate" had knowledge of the
plaintiff's ownership, and regardless of that knowledge, still registered the domain name. Panavision Int'l L.P.
v. Toeppen[109] is generally the accepted precedent for cybersquatting cases. Nonetheless, the cases,
Archdiocese and J4J confirm that squatting, coupled with a forum state's long-arm statute, qualifies as a per
se "significant contact" for jurisdiction, as well as a per se violation of trademark law.
C. Federal Trademark Dilution Act[110]
{29} Soon after its enactment, the FTDA became a litigation tool for trademark owner - plaintiffs.[111]
Internet trademark scholars asserted that, "[u]nder the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, use of a similar mark
on dissimilar goods may cause erosion of a famous mark's goodwill and lead to liability."[112] In establishing
the FTDA, Congress expressly intended to " 'help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those
choosing marks associated with the products and reputations of others.'"[113]
{30} The FTDA, originally passed in 1995,[114] grants plaintiffs a civil remedy in commercial situations of
false representation of origin, false descriptions, and dilution of registered marks.[115] The most recent
amendments to the FTDA include civil remedies for trade dress infringement.[116] Although the remedies
generally available under the FTDA are limited to injunction relief against continued use of the famous mark,
a defendant who acts willfully or otherwise acts in bad faith, may also be liable for the trademark owner's
actual losses, or in the alternative, the extent of the defendant's profits.
{31} The FTDA offers no specific guidance to determine the values of famous marks or the degree of
dilution.[117] Some courts have provided statutory interpretation. For example, the court in Hasbro, Inc. v.
Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd[118] found that the defendant's use of the domain name
"CANDYLAND.COM" for a sexually-explicit Internet website diluted and tarnished the famous children's
board game, CANDYLAND and its trademark.[119] The Federal District Court of the Western District of
Washington ruled in favor of Hasbro, Inc., despite the fact that the parties' goods and services were unrelated.
[120]
{32} J4J and Archdiocese serve as justification for the establishment of the FTDA. It is accepted that the
FTDA provides injunctive, and in some cases, monetary relief to a company whose existing famous
trademark is "tarnished" or "blurred" by a third party's use of the same or similar mark. However, the
decisions in Archdiocese and J4J confirm that protection extends only to commercial enterprises and
noncommercial organizations with commercial potential.[121]
D. Standard for Granting Injunctive Relief
{33} A prevalent remedy in intellectual property cases is injunction, a concept based on property law.[122]
Trademark owners have a right to injunctive relief as a matter of course,[123] and such rights are granted by
the Lanham Act.[124]
{34} The J4J court considered four major requirements for granting injunctive relief. Key to the court's
review were the following factors:
1) the likelihood that plaintiff would prevail on the merits at the hearing;
2) the extent that plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm by Defendant's conduct;
3) the extent that Defendant would be harmed by the injunction; and
4) the public interest.[125]
Courts previously focused on these factors, and if any one element was missing, the court would deny the
claim.[126] Surveying other federal domain name cases, the J4J court concluded that it could offer a
preliminary injunction where similar factors could be substituted for the ones mentioned.[127] In substituting
factors, the courts considered the likelihood of confusion as an issue relating to whether the plaintiff would
prevail on the merits of his claims.[128] Several cases, which were factually similar to J4J, indicated that
unfair competition, dilution, and false designation were all to be considered by courts regarding the question
of a meritorious claim.[129] Incorporating these factors, claims for trademark infringement would then be
entertained.[130] Thus, the J4J case offers an alternative standard for granting injunctive relief in Internet
cases.
E. Genericness, Scope of Trademark Registration, and Dilution
{35} In proving infringement, the validity and legal protectability of a mark, as well as the defendant's use of
the mark, must be demonstrated.[131] J4J's mark was considered incontestable because it was registered. The
defendant did not disagree with this point.[132] Instead, he argued that the phrase he used in the domain
name did not infringe upon the mark because J4J used the "Star of David."[133] The court, however, looked
to the fact that it was not possible to use such a symbol in the domain name. J4J had three stylistic options
available to them: utilizing hyphens, underlining, or no spaces. The organization chose hyphens as its stylistic
option.[134] The court found Brodsky's rationale unsatisfactory, stating that infringement does not require
exactness.[135] Actually, the fact that the domain was nearly identical to the mark was sufficient under the
court's rationale.[136] Thus, any organization or business that has symbols in its tradename has possible
causes of action for infringement, if it can prove an alleged infringer's phonetic substitution.
{36} Generic marks, those which note the basic nature of articles or services, cannot be protected by
trademark.[137] In J4J, Brodsky argued that the term "jews for jesus" fell into this generic category, and
therefore, he did not infringe upon the J4J trademark. Brodsky supported his argument with references to
Blinded Veterans Association v. Blinded American Veterans Foundation.[138]
{37} The court distinguished J4J from Blinded Veterans Association by addressing whether the phrase "jews
for jesus" was protectable on the issues of genericness, suggestiveness, and secondary meaning.[139] In
Blinded Veterans, the issue was whether the unregistered mark of "blinded veterans" was generic.[140] The
court decided the term was generic, because it was used to describe members of the organization, rather than
the organization itself.[141] Comparing J4J, the court found that members of J4J referred to themselves as
Christian Jews, Messianic Jews, Jews For Christianity, Hebrew Christians, and so forth. Therefore, the term
"jews for jesus" does not monopolize all of the concepts associated with members of the Jewish faith who
embrace Christian beliefs.[142]
{38} This rationale is consistent with what copyright law refers to as the doctrine of mergers[143] Consistent
with this doctrine, a phrase is accepted as a descriptive mark, while the secondary meaning must be proven.
With no consistent set of elements for this test, the court considered advertizing, media, attempts to plagiarize
the mark, and length of exclusivity, among other factors.[144] Heavy use contributed to the secondary
meaning of the mark as referring to a sect of not merely Messianic Jews, but also to the organization itself.
[145]
{39} Brodsky also attempted to argue that J4J's use of the mark should be limited by its registration, and
since the Internet was not included, mark protection could not be extended to the Internet.[146] In support of
his argument, the defendant offered the Third Circuit's ruling in National Footwear.[147] In this case, a claim
for trademark infringement was not extended to cover clothing and accessories, where the registration
indicated footwear, "namely shoes, slippers and boots."[148] The court determined that this argument was not
well founded, since th plaintiff sought to protect products which were registered, namely religious pamphlets.
[149] The Internet is not a different product classification, but rather a method of publication.[150]
{40} Plaintiff, J4J was also able to prove likelihood of confusion,[151] similarity,[152] and strength of its
mark.[153] Claims of dilution, blurring, and tarnishment were all potential claims for the plaintiff, but the
defendant claimed that his site contained non-commercial speech and was therefore exempt from any dilution
claim.[154] The court, however, considered more than the commercial speech issue in its analysis.[155]
Instead, the court looked to the intent of the defendant's site (to lure J4J searchers), and to the fact that
Brodsky was selling merchandise, soliciting funds for political activities, and undermining J4J commercially.
[156] Thus, the defendant's speech was determined not likely to be exempt.[157]
{41} The unfair competition and false designation claims prevailed for purposes of the injunction because of
the statements made by Brodsky.[158] According to the court's findings, Brodsky intended to trick, deceive,
and intercept J4J searchers.[159] As to the issue of competition, the court found it unnecessary for Brodsky to
put goods into commerce,[160] but found that his mere frustration of J4J efforts of distribution and offering
of services was sufficient.[161]
{42} Since the defendant could not prove irreparable harm secondary to an injunction, nor could he establish
that the public's right not to be deceived was paramount, the court granted the injunction.[162] The court
concluded that Brodsky was still free to make his statements, but could not do so on a "trademark infringing"
site.[163]
 
V. CONCLUSION
{43} Traditional English common law, consisting of "our passion for justice, freedom and individual liberty"
derives from the Bible itself.[164] Authors James Wood and Derek Davis surmise that, "[i]t was religion, at
least in part, which gave birth to America."[165] For example, the Declaration of Independence is laden with
references to a "Supreme Deity" and Christian values.[166] However, the well-known doctrine of separation
of church and state, championed by Thomas Jefferson, complements the fact that America is a secular nation
with a thriving religious society,[167] fostering a complex collection of laws relative to religious observation
and rights. Technology, which has rapidly entered our businesses, has also rapidly entered our religious lives.
Despite this rapid induction of technology, the changing face of cyber litigation is still influenced by religious
organizations.
{44} The Church has evolved into a powerful legal and financial entity.[168] Beginning as the central glue
which motivated the colonists, the Church established the nation's first public mass education schemes and
social welfare programs.[169] Today, churches influence both social policy and political power.[170] It is not
surprising that the Church, which has long played a role in public policy, now plays a role in shaping Internet
policy.[171]
{45} While churches, synagogues and temples stake their places in Cyberspace, courts recognize that
churches are entitled to protection from unfair competition by barring trademark and tradename infringement.
[172] However, whether the trademark issue is commercial, as with Archdiocese, or non-commercial, as with
J4J, courts consistently hold religious organizations to the same standard of proof as they do commercial
enterprises.[173]
{46} Churches, as guardians of the spiritual world, are now laying claim to another non-physical realm: the
realm of Cyberspace. No longer merely passive congregations, churches are now considered formidable
political and financial forces.[174] Today, the Church's influence impacts much of modern society. Not
surprisingly, litigation concerning the Church and the Internet, such as in the J4J and Archdiocese cases, is
bound to increase and to continue to pioneer the metaphysical frontier of Cyberspace.
-Ramona Leigh Taylor
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